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In 1989, the United States imposed an embargo on the importation of 
shrimp from countries that used fishing methods harmful to marine turtles.  The 
shrimp were not a protected endangered species, but the marine turtles were.  
The embargo was thus motivated by the rightful concern to protect an animal 
species from extinction.  Claiming this embargo to be a violation of Article XI 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994), which pro-
vided for the general elimination of quantitative restrictions on trade, India, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand commenced proceedings on the basis of the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). 
In United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Prod-
ucts (Shrimp–Turtle),1 the WTO Appellate Body concluded that Section 609 of 
Public Law 101-1622 “has been applied by the United States in a manner which 
constitutes arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination between Members of the 
WTO . . . [:]”3 
[W]ith respect to neither type of certification under Section 609(b)(2) is there a trans-
parent, predictable certification process that is followed by the competent United 
States government officials.  The certification processes under Section 609 consist 
principally of administrative ex parte inquiry or verification by staff of the Office of 
Marine Conservation in the Department of State with staff of the United States Na-
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 1. WTO Appellate Body, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Prod-
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tional Marine Fisheries Service.  With respect to both types of certification, there is no 
formal opportunity for an applicant country to be heard, or to respond to any argu-
ments that may be made against it, in the course of the certification process before a 
decision to grant or to deny certification is made.  Moreover, no formal written, rea-
soned decision, whether of acceptance or rejection, is rendered on applications for ei-
ther type of certification, whether under Section 609(b)(2)(A) and (B) or under Sec-
tion 609(b)(2)(C).  Countries which are granted certification are included in a list of 
approved applications published in the Federal Register; however, they are not noti-
fied specifically.  Countries whose applications are denied also do not receive notice of 
such denial (other than by omission from the list of approved applications) or of the 
reasons for the denial.  No procedure for review of, or appeal from, a denial of an ap-
plication is provided.4 
This decision was made pursuant to Article XX of the GATT 1994, according to 
which “such measures are not [to be] applied in a manner which would consti-
tute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international 
trade . . . .”5  It follows that for states to respect the prohibition on arbitrary dis-
crimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, as required 
by the GATT norm, they must respect the principle of due process.  Though 
usually established by national laws, the principle of due process also can enter 
national administrative law through another door:  by being established at the 
international level and then applied at the national one. 
The Shrimp–Turtle case concerning the U.S. import prohibition is not the 
only case in which an international treaty or international organization imposed 
procedural principles upon state administrations.6  This article will examine 
some of these principles and evaluate the way they operate in the global con-
text. 
This topic illustrates the degree to which global law penetrates national legal 
systems by dictating principles and criteria that national administrations must 
respect and that private actors may wield in their own interest.  Though belong-
ing to different national legal systems, these rules are nevertheless subject to the 
global system.  We have come to expect and accept international organizations 
that set substantive standards (establishing, for example, legal levels of pollution 
or limiting the genetic manipulation of agricultural products), so it is easy to ar-
gue that national administrations ought to respect global substantive goals, 
standards, and criteria.  More interesting, however, are examples of procedural 
 
 4. Id. at 54, ¶ 180 (citations omitted).  Many have commented upon this decision.  See, e.g., R. 
Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baseline for the Trade and 
Environment, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 491 (2002). 
 5. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 262, avail-
able at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2005) [hereinafter 
GATT] (incorporated into General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 1A, 
THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS 17 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 190 [hereinafter GATT 1994]). 
 6. See G. della Cananea, Beyond the State: the Europeanization and Globalization of Procedural 
Administrative Law, 9 EUR. PUB. L. 563-78 (2003) (identifying and discussing two trends: an increasing 
Europeanization of administrative procedures and a globalization of administrative procedures due to 
the influence of new international organizations). 
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principles and criteria.  These usually are established at the national level, by 
courts or laws like the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act (APA)7 or equivalent 
laws in Spain, Germany, and Italy.8  It is more difficult to affirm that national 
administrations ought also to respect global constraints regarding the proce-
dural aspects of their activity and to recognize that global standards effectively 
limit the purely national scope of administrative laws and increase the degree to 
which national administrations are subject to the rule of law, both national and 
global.  This difficulty arises in part because recognizing such duties as those of 
consultation, transparency, due process, and judicial review means recognizing 
globally established private rights against national public administrations, the 
exercise of which cannot be limited to just national citizens, as is generally the 
case with nationally established procedural rights.  The global legal order grants 
the rights of consultation and intervention in national administrative procedures 
to the citizens of other states as well as nationals, as will be seen in greater de-
tail below. 
Global procedural standards are particularly sophisticated in the area of 
trade in services.  It cannot be said for this area that the opening of national 
frontiers by global law—and the concomitant procedural constraints—have 
been driven by the interests of multinational corporations and the most devel-
oped nations.  Rather, the rule of law and the principles of participation, trans-
parency, due process, and judicial review, well developed in most domestic laws, 
provide “rules of the game” that do not necessarily favor those constituencies. 
After a preliminary discussion of administrative law as state law, this article 
identifies the global regulatory regime characterized by permanent rules and 
briefly describes the characteristics common to different instruments in this sys-
tem.  It then turns to the peculiarities of this global regime, organizing them 
into four categories:  the regulators, the regulated, the regulatory process, and 
the legal status of the rules.  Three aspects respecting the regulators are ana-
lyzed:  (1) regulation set forth by international treaties and regulation set forth 
by secondary regulators, like the committees of international organizations; (2) 
the schism between the authors of the regulation and the authorities overseeing 
national compliance with it; and (3) the disintegration of the states produced by 
singling out national authorities that act as partners with the international au-
thorities.  As for the regulated, this article considers the regulations’ “vertical” 
effect between international organizations and states and their “horizontal” ef-
fect between the states themselves, as well as other relationships between states 
and interested parties established by the international legal order.  In the dis-
cussion of the regulatory process, itself, this article examines the peculiarity of 
 
 7. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 5 U.S.C. (2000)). 
 8. See Ley de Procedimiento Administrativo (B.O.E. 18.07.1958); Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz, 
v. 25.5.1976 (BGBl. I S.1253); Nuove norme in materia di procedimento amministrativo e di diritto di 
accesso ai documenti amministrativi, Law no. 241 of Aug. 7, 1990 (It.), Gazzetta Ufficiale della 
Repubblica Italiana (Gazz. Uff.) No. 192 (Aug. 18, 1990), respectively. 
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voluntary, self-imposed mutual recognition and the characteristics of the notice 
and comment procedure as applied to interstate relations and to the relations 
between states and private parties.  Finally, in considering the legal status of 
these international administrative measures, this article examines both their 
non-binding character and the source of their effectiveness. 
This article does not consider the ways in which domestic legal systems react 
in their contact with international administrative law; thus, it does not address 
whether the institutions governed by this law are altered and adapted to the na-
tional context, whether international institutions spread as contagious infec-
tions, or whether national legal systems instead resist and reject international 
norms (and at what cost).  Neither does it consider whether global principles 
and standards conflict with national ones, creating potential asymmetries be-
tween sectors governed only by national law and those tied to global law.  Fi-
nally, this paper does not consider whether the national application of global 
(and thus non-indigenous) procedural principles is merely ritualistic, slows 
down state action, or benefits the particular groups that make instrumental use 
of it. 
II 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AS STATE LAW 
Historically, administrative law has sprung from national states.  Public ad-
ministrations belong to a national community, and they depend structurally on 
national, or state, governments.  Because of the principle of legality, these ad-
ministrations are subjected to laws and regulated by them.  Administrative law 
is thus fundamentally state law. 
History thus suggests the impossibility of international administrative law, 
because public administrations are exclusively national phenomena. And his-
tory suggests the impossibility of global governance of national administrative 
laws, because only within the state can there be an administration that enjoys a 
monopoly of executive power, and only within the state can there be the au-
thority versus liberty dialectic that characterizes administrative law.9  A global 
system governing national administrative law cannot exist, in short, because 
administrative governance finds its source exclusively in national law.  As Otto 
Mayer, one of the founders of German administrative law, observed, the na-
tional public power is the lord in its own domain, to the exclusion of all others; 
therefore, the action of a foreign power on the territory of a foreign state can be 
considered valid only in exceptional situations.10  If international obligations ex-
ist, they must pass through the filters of national law, which transform them into 
national rules. 
 
 9. This formulation comes from D. Donati and is cited and discussed in STEFANO BATTINI, 
AMMINISTRAZIONI SENZA STATO: PROFILI DI DIRITTO AMMINISTRATIVO INTERNAZIONALE 31 
(2003). 
 10. 4 OTTO MAYER, LE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF ALLEMAND 354 (1906). 
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Two developments have called this traditional perspective into question.  
The first is the rise of an international administrative law tied to global admini-
strations rather than to the state.  The second is the rise of global rules declared 
by treaties or international organizations, but addressed to states and private 
actors.  These international norms penetrate domestic legal systems, thus hav-
ing an effect on national administrative laws. 
These two developments are distinct, but related.  The first, which will not 
be analyzed here, are the global limits placed on national administrations by in-
ternational bodies, which operate according to a non-state law (and also, in 
part, according to treaties).  Of particular interest here, however, is the second 
development, which represents an intrusion of global rules on national admini-
strations.  It is important to understand how the interference of the global with 
the national occurs, whether it corresponds to the practices of other interna-




There are many different kinds of international administrative norms.  
These norms can have either an ad hoc character or a permanent one.  An ex-
ample of ad hoc norms is the World Bank Operational Policies, which require a 
public consultation on the environmental assessment of projects proposed for 
Bank financing.11  Under these policies, national law is obliged to respect the 
principle of private participation in administrative proceedings.  A national ad-
ministration that disregards this norm cannot obtain financing. 
Even more interesting are the permanent norms.  Four of these, examined 
here, all follow the same model.  They are set forth in the following legal in-
struments:  the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS Agreement),12 the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT Agreement),13 the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),14 
and the Principles for Food Import and Export Inspection and Certification 
 
 11. See BATTINI, supra note 9, at 262. 
 12. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO 
Agreement, Annex 1A, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF 
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 59 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 493, available at 
http://www.wto.org./english/tratop_e/sps_e/ spsagr_e.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2005) [hereinafter SPS 
Agreement]. 
 13. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, THE 
LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 
121 (1999), 1868 U.N.T.S. 120, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2005) [hereinafter TBT Agreement]. 
 14. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1B, THE 
LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 
284 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2005) [hereinafter GATS]. 
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(FIEIC).15  The first three instruments belong to the legal system of the WTO,16 
while the fourth was adopted by the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Pro-
gramme Codex Alimentarius Commission.17 
Although varying in their details, these four instruments present common 
characteristics:  First, the norms in these instruments are aimed at ensuring the 
balancing of conflicting interests.  They seek to guarantee free trade, but also to 
protect health and consumer interests.  The SPS Agreement seeks to reconcile 
free trade with the sanitary and phytosanitary measures necessary to protect 
human, animal, and plant health.  The TBT Agreement seeks to balance the 
needs of international commerce with the safety of products and processes, be-
cause excessively and unjustifiably complex national rules governing products, 
processes, and methods of production might discriminate against foreign prod-
ucts.18  The GATS seeks to limit the professional requirements one must meet 
and procedures one must follow to practice a profession, in order to prevent 
such rules from operating as barriers to the free circulation of services.  The 
FIEIC seeks to facilitate international trade in foodstuffs while ensuring ade-
quate protection of consumer health.  All these instruments aim at preventing 
restrictions on trade in goods and services through disguised barriers, like 
health or technical requirements, which would favor national products and im-
pede the importation of foreign ones. 
Second, these instruments establish a link—and require a balance—among 
collective public interests, one of which is international trade. The four instru-
ments considered here are just some of the many existing “linkages,” or “trade 
ands,” because the pervasiveness of trade connects it with a host of other con-
 
 15. Principles for Food Import and Export Inspection and Certification System, Doc. No. CAC/GL 
20-1995, in CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMM’N, FOOD IMPORT AND EXPORT INSPECTION AND 
CERTIFICATION SYSTEM—COMBINED TEXTS 1 (2000) (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), available 
at http://www.fao.org/documents/ show_cdr.asp?url_file=/DOCREP/005/X4489E/x4489e02.htm 
[hereinafter FIEIC]. 
 16. On the WTO, see JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (2d ed. 1997); ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW (2002); PAOLO PICONE & ALDO LIGUSTRO, DIRITTO DELL’ORGANIZZAZIONE 
MONDIALE DEL COMMERCIO (2002); GABRIELLA VENTURINI, L’ORGANIZZAZIONE MONDIALE DEL 
COMMERCIO (2000); THE EU, THE WTO AND THE NAFTA: TOWARDS A COMMON LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE? (J.H.H. Weiler ed., 2000) [hereinafter THE EU, THE WTO AND THE 
NAFTA].  On the WTO’s dispute settlement systems, see ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE 
GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (1997); 11 STUDIES IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
LAW: INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann ed. 1997). 
 17. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Health 
Organization (WHO) created the Codex Alimentarius Commission in 1963 to develop food standards, 
guidelines, and related texts such as codes of practice under the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards 
Programme.  FAO/WHO Food Standards, Codex Alimentarius (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), 
available at http://www.codexalimentarius.net/ web/index_en.jsp (last visited Feb. 21, 2005). 
 18. On the balancing relative to the TBT agreement, see WTO Appellate Body, European Com-
munities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, Doc. No. 
01-1157 (March 12, 2001). 
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cerns, such as the environment, employment, competition, corporate law, for-
eign investments, development, immigration policy, and poverty.19 
Third, these instruments contain five types of common provisions, which re-
late to transparency, harmonization, equivalence, consultation, and control pro-
cedures.  To ensure transparency, these instruments require national admini-
strations to publish their requirements promptly so they can be made known to 
other national administrations and interested parties.  A reasonable period 
should be allowed before a new requirement takes effect in order to allow pro-
ducers in exporting countries to adapt their products or methods of production.  
To the same end, Members must establish enquiry points to provide informa-
tion to other states or to private actors.  There are some variations in how the 
agreements discussed here implement this norm, however.  For example, some 
instruments require Members to supply requested documents to nationals of 
other Members at the same price, while others require Members to provide in-
formation and assistance.20 
Fourth, to ensure harmonization, these instruments encourage national ad-
ministrations to base their measures on international standards, guidelines, or 
recommendations.21  These norms are formally non-binding, but measures based 
on them are presumed to be consistent with the relevant international provi-
sions of the treaties.  Standards, guidelines, and recommendations are not set 
forth by the agreements themselves.  Instead, they are issued by other interna-
tional organizations in which the Member States are required to participate.  
Examples of such international organizations include the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, the International Office of Epizootics, the International Plant Pro-
tection Convention, the International Standard Organization (ISO), and the In-
ternational Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). 
Fifth, to ensure equivalency, all four agreements provide that Members 
should accept the measures of other states as equivalent if the exporting state 
objectively demonstrates that its measures achieve the importing state’s level of 
protection.  The obligation to demonstrate equivalence rests with the exporting 
country.  The Member States also may sign bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments on the recognition of the equivalence of specified measures.22 
If no international standards, guidelines, or recommendations exist, or if a 
national measure does not respect the international standard, guideline, or rec-
 
 19. See generally BATTINI, supra note 9, at 236–37; John H. Jackson, Afterword: The Linkage Prob-
lem – Comments on Five Texts, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 118 (2002) (commenting on how the five articles in 
the issue addressed “the problem of linkage between ‘nontrade’ subjects and the World Trade Organi-
zation” and making some general observations on the subject); Martin Nettesheim, Legitimizing the 
WTO: the dispute settlement process as formalized arbitration, 53 RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE DI DIRITTO 
PUBBLICO 711, 716, 719, 722-24 (2003). 
 20. GATS pt. II, art. III; SPS Agreement annex B, ¶¶ 1-3; TBT Agreement art. 2, ¶ 11 and arts. 10, 
12; FIEIC, supra note 15, at 3-4, ¶¶ 14 – 17. 
 21. GATS pt. II, art. VI, ¶ 5(b); SPS Agreement art. 4; TBT Agreement art. 2, ¶ 4 and art. 5; 
FIEIC, supra note 15, at 3, ¶ 12. 
 22. GATS pt. II, art. VII; SPS Agreement art. 4, ¶ 2; TBT Agreement art. 2, § 7; FIEIC, supra note 
15, at 3, ¶ 13. 
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ommendation, the Member shall follow a procedure of notification and consul-
tation that involves publishing a notice of the measure to enable interested 
Members to become acquainted with it, notifying other Members of the prod-
ucts to be covered by the regulation, providing other Members with copies of 
the proposed regulation, and allowing other Members reasonable time to make 
comments, discuss them upon request, and take the comments and the results of 
the discussion into account.23  In the case of sanitary and phytosanitary meas-
ures, for example, a state may choose a higher level of protection, but it must 
demonstrate that this is justified and does not result in arbitrary discrimination. 
Finally, these four international agreements set forth restrictions on national 
procedures of certification and control.  National procedures must respect the 
following principles:  equivalence of assessment and control procedures for im-
ported and domestic products, expedient execution of the procedures (without 
undue delays) and the avoidance of undue delay in considering an application, 
no overly burdensome requirements, confidentiality, reasonableness and pro-
portionality, and a procedure for reviewing decisions.24 
IV 
THE REGULATORS 
The body of legal rules summarized here derives both from international 
agreements and from decisions of the collegial bodies established by the agree-
ments themselves.25  The distinction between the agreements and the collegial 
bodies they create is important because standards derived from interstate 
agreements—that is, agreements between states—disciplining state administra-
tion are acts of self-restraint undertaken by the states themselves.  By contrast, 
standards established by the collegial bodies of international organizations rep-
resent an external limitation, even if state representatives belong to these bod-
ies.  This distinction is not only formal, but also substantial.  Interstate agree-
 
 23. SPS Agreement annex B, ¶ 5; TBT Agreement art. 2, ¶ 9; FIEIC, supra note 15, at 3-4, ¶ 15; 
WTO Council for Trade in Services, Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector, 
S/L/64, Doc. No. 98-5140 (Dec. 17, 1998) (see “Transparency”). 
 24. GATS pt. II, art. VI; SPS Agreement annex C; TBT Agreement art. 5, ¶¶ 1–3; FIEIC, supra 
note 15, at 4, ¶ 19.  There is abundant literature on the SPS, TBT, and GATS cited in PICONE & 
LIGUSTRO, supra note 16.  See also CHRISTOPHER ARUP, THE NEW WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
AGREEMENTS—GLOBALIZING LAW THROUGH SERVICES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2000); 
ALAN O. SYKES, PRODUCT STANDARDS FOR INTERNATIONALLY INTEGRATED GOODS MARKETS 
(1995); J.P. Trachtman, Lessons for the GATS from Existing WTO Rules on Domestic Regulation, in 
DOMESTIC REGULATION & SERVICE TRADE LIBERALIZATION 57 (Aaditya Mattoo & Pierre Sauvé 
eds., 2003); Margareta Djordjevic, Domestic Regulation and Free Trade in Services—A Balancing Act, 
29 LEGAL ISSUES ECON. INTEGRATION 305 (2002); Terence P. Stewart & David S. Johanson, The SPS 
Agreement of the World Trade Organization and International Organizations: the Roles of the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, the International Plant Protection Convention, and the International Office of 
Epizootics, 26 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 27 (1998). 
 25. These bodies include the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, regulated by 
SPS art. 12 and art. 5, ¶ 5; the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, regulated by TBT art. 13; the 
Council for Trade in Services, regulated by GATS arts. XXIV and VI, ¶ 4; the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission; and the Committee on Import/Export Inspection and Certification Systems. 
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ments are the work of national governments and the legislative bodies that rat-
ify them.  The collegial organs of international organizations, by contrast, are 
made up of national civil servants. 
The Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures is one such colle-
gial body.  Adopting guidelines in June 2000 envisaged by Article 5, Paragraph 
5 of the SPS Agreement for applying the concept of the appropriate level of 
protection, it declared that new measures must be based on a comparison with 
the previous ones, with national measures addressing analogous risks, with 
measures adopted by international bodies, and with measures adopted in other 
countries and based on technical opinions.26 The Committee on Technical Bar-
riers to Trade, another example of these collegial bodies, has established norms 
for the implementation of articles27 concerning transparency and notification 
obligations, recommending that Members designate the government authority 
or agency that will examine comments, acknowledge receipt of the comments, 
specify the ways in which the comments will be taken into account, and provide 
further information when necessary.28  A third example, the Council for Trade 
in Services, adopted disciplines29 intended to facilitate the liberalization of trade 
in accounting services by ensuring that domestic laws do not constitute unneces-
sary barriers to such trade.  Under these disciplines, Members are required to 
designate a national administrative authority, notify other Members of new 
measures, and establish professional licensing criteria and predetermined quali-
fication requirements that are publicly available, objective, proportional, and 
reasonable.30  In international law, as is common in European law, these com-
mittees are made up of national bureaucrats rather than government represen-
tatives.  They function as clearinghouses for national interests, as connecting 
bodies, and as centers of secondary rulemaking. 
International agreements do not themselves fix the standards, guidelines, 
and recommendations to which the Members are invited to conform, nor do 
they entrust this job to the bodies constituted by the agreements themselves; in-
stead, they route this job to other international bodies, using a connection tech-
nique known as “borrowing regimes.”  There is, therefore, a schism between the 
regulators on the one hand, and the authors of the regulation on the other.  In 
the context of the WTO, it has been observed that, 
on the one hand, the WTO avails itself of the Codex Commission’s work for the har-
monization of national regulations likely to prejudice free international trade; that is 
the interest protected by that organization.  On the other hand, the Codex Commis-
sion, in order to guarantee the safety of foodstuffs, borrows from the greater institu-
tional effectiveness of the WTO system: its standards are not in themselves binding 
 
 26. WTO Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Guidelines to Further the Practical 
Implementation of Article 5.5, G/SPS/15, Doc. No. 00-2955 (July 18, 2000). 
 27. TBT Agreement art. 2, ¶ 9–10; art. 3, ¶ 2; art. 5, ¶¶ 6–7; and art. 7, ¶ 2  
 28. WTO SECRETARIAT, TRANSPARENCY PROVISIONS OF THE TBT AGREEMENT (2002), avail-
able at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/booklet_transparency_e.doc. 
 29. Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector [hereinafter Disciplines] in 
GATS art. VI, ¶ 4. 
 30. WTO Council for Trade in Services, supra note 23. 
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upon States, but the degree of their observance has markedly increased owing to the 
application of these standards by the dispute resolution bodies of the WTO.31 
The WTO stands at the heart of the system.  Through the medium of trade, the 
WTO ultimately regulates—or, better yet, lends its regulatory force to—
different authorities to implement rules regarding very diverse sectors, such as 
the environment, agriculture, plants, health, and food safety.  There is, in this 
sense, a certain resemblance between the WTO and the European Union:  both 
revolve around the circulation of goods and services (though the E.U. also pro-
tects the free circulation of persons and businesses).  Both ultimately penetrate 
other sectors in order to balance competing and conflicting interests.  The proc-
ess of E.U. transformation from a sectoral authority into a general public au-
thority is, however, substantially more advanced.32 
The agreements require that the Members designate a government author-
ity responsible for performing the activity subject to international obligations33 
or designate an enquiry point.34  In this way, the state is substantially disaggre-
gated:  the designated national office becomes the body of reference for the in-
ternational organization.  The paradigm of the state as a unit is thus cast aside 




The second noteworthy aspect of this international regulation lies in how it 
operates.  It has a vertical effect, in the sense that it penetrates within the state, 
circumventing national legislation in order to address national public admini-
strations directly.  This is the product of harmonization.  International regula-
tion is not directed solely at states, however.  It is also addressed to sub-state 
entities and even to private ones.  The TBT Agreement, for example, concerns 
 
 31. Stefano Battini, Il sistema istituzionale internazionale. Dalla frammentazione alla connessione, 
12 RIVISTA ITALIANA DI DIRITTO PUBBLICO COMUNITARIO 969, 986 (2002) (quotation translated for 
use in this article); see also Armin von Bogdandy, Legitimacy of International Economic Governance: 
Interpretative Approaches to WTO Law and the Prospects of its Proceduralization, in INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND NON-ECONOMIC CONCERNS: NEW CHALLENGES FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 103, 109 (Stefan Griller ed., 2003); Steve Charnovitz, Triangulating 
the World Trade Organization, 96 AM. J. INT’ L. 28, 50-55 (2002).  Borrowing regimes is a widespread 
phenomenon: for example, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank lend their own 
power to the rules and criteria established by the Basel Committee, asking that national administrations 
apply them and verify their observance. 
 32. On the difference between the WTO and the E.U., see von Bogdandy, supra note 31, at 122-26. 
 33. See, e.g.,  SPS Agreement, Annex B, ¶ 10. 
 34. See, e.g., SPS Agreement, Annex B, ¶ 3 and TBT Agreement, art. 10, ¶ 1.  The latter states, 
“Each Member, shall ensure that an enquiry point exists which is able to answer all reasonable enquir-
ies from other Members and interested parties in other Members.” 
 35. On this, see BATTINI, supra note 9, at 211.  See generally Sabino Cassese, Relations Between 
International Organizations and National Administrations, in XIXTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCES, BERLIN (WEST) 1983: PROCEEDINGS 159, 177-80 (1983) (examining the 
international role of domestic bureaucracies). 
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not only central governments but also the local governments and non-
governmental bodies that establish technical rules.  The Agreement regulates 
the preparation, adoption, and application of technical regulations and proce-
dures for the assessment of conformity by central government bodies36 and local 
government and non-governmental bodies.37  The Member States must ensure 
that local governments and non-governmental bodies comply with requirements 
established by the TBT, but addressed directly to the sub-state bodies. 
International regulation also produces a horizontal effect, in the sense that it 
requires a kind of dialogue between states.  This dialogue unfolds in two differ-
ent ways.  First, national public administrations are required to compare con-
tinuously their own and other countries’ measures.  Second, national public ad-
ministrations are encouraged to enter into equivalence or mutual recognition 
agreements.  Global regulation thus not only imposes itself vertically on states, 
but it also requires States to open themselves up reciprocally—laterally, as it 
were—respecting procedural rules in their relations. 
This twofold effect, vertical and horizontal, and the relationship between in-
ternational organizations and states, also can be seen in the E.U.  Here, too, 
harmonization is required from on high and is accompanied by mutual recogni-
tion.   
Differences between international and European administrative law never-
theless abound.  Whether in the vertical or the horizontal sense, global regula-
tion is addressed to national public administrations.  But private parties, active 
within states, also are increasingly interested in it.  They participate in the proc-
esses of legislation, administration, and adjudication.  One example of private 
participation in the legislative process is the Disciplines.  The International 
Federation of Accountants (IFAC) and national organizations like the National 
Council of Accountants and Business Consultants in Italy have played an im-
portant role in promoting, preparing, and developing global standards, first in 
the Working Party on Domestic Regulation, then in the Council for Trade in 
Services.38  National organizations (be they public or private, as dictated by the 
national law governing professional organizations) and (private) international 
organizations have thus taken part in the process of the formation of substan-
tive global law.  One example of the administrative process allowing and accept-
ing private participation is the TBT, according to which, “Each Member shall 
ensure that an enquiry point exists which is able to answer all reasonable en-
quiries from other Members and interested parties in other Members.”39  An-
other example of private participation is in adjudication—American companies 
 
 36. TBT Agreement arts. 2, 5. 
 37. TBT Agreement arts. 3, 7-8. 
 38. On the role of the IFAC, see Claude Trolliet & John Hegarty, Regulatory Reform and Trade 
Liberalization in Accountancy Services, in DOMESTIC REGULATION & SERVICE TRADE 
LIBERALIZATION, supra note 24, at 147.  Information on the role of the Italian National Council of Ac-
countants and Business Consultants was obtained by direct research of the Council’s archives. 
 39. TBT Agreement art. 10, ¶ 1. 
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working with U.S. public authorities “to challenge foreign trade barriers before 
the WTO legal system.”40 
Despite such examples, one view of the global legal system is that it leaves 
no place for private actors.  According to that view, private actors stand in a le-
gal relationship to the states alone, and the states must mediate their relation-
ship to the global legal system.  That view considers the global and domestic le-
gal orders to be two separate systems, existing upon different levels, in which 
there would be no unmediated relations between private actors and global or-
ganizations.   
However, legal relationships do exist between the infrastatal and the global 
levels, however difficult and incomplete they might still be.  It is thus foresee-
able that when, for example, the Disciplines are complete and have been incor-
porated into the GATS, accountants from one country, acting through their 
own national authorities, will be able to contest the legitimacy of the behavior 
of public authorities in another country (for example, charging that they vio-
lated the duty of transparency) before the judicial bodies of the WTO.  This will 
create a triangle consisting of an accountant in one country (acting through his 
own national authority), the global judicial authority, and the public authority 
of the other country. 
VI 
THE REGULATORY PROCESS 
The third noteworthy aspect of international regulation has to do with the 
regulatory process.  State obligations deriving from international regulation are 
addressed to procedures—obligations such as consultation and discussion, re-
spect for the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, and the duty to 
give a response within a fixed period.  By requiring national legal systems to re-
spect the procedural obligations of consultation, transparency, reasonableness, 
and proportionality, the global system thus imports legal principles into national 
systems, and thereby “denationalizes” the relevant areas or sectors.41 
The regulatory process at the international level also incorporates the prac-
tice of mutual recognition.  This is a widespread practice that overcomes the 
 
 40. GREGORY C. SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP IN WTO 
LITIGATION 5 (2003). 
 41. Because “the Appellate Body proceduralizes the substantive WTO obligations,” it has 
extended “basic elements of the democratic principle and the rule of law to aliens.”  See von Bogdandy, 
supra note 31, at 128, 132.  The phenomenon of proceduralizing substantive obligations is also evident 
in other cases, like in the Poverty Reduction Strategies of the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund.  These two organizations grant loans to low-income countries on the condition that national 
programs are prepared with the participation of government and administrative bodies, as well as 
interested parties such as civil society organizations, minorities, unions, and research institutes, and that 
the results of such participation be taken into account in preparation of the programs.  See The World 
Bank Group, Topics in Development, Poverty, Poverty Reduction Strategies (on file with Law & 
Contemp. Probs.), http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/ 
EXTPRS/0,,menuPK:384207~pagePK:149018~piPK:149093~theSitePK:384201,00.html (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2005). 
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dualism between international and domestic law by enabling a national author-
ity to make decisions that have direct effects in other national legal systems.  In 
the E.U., where the principle of mutual recognition originated before spreading 
to international law,42 it was developed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), 
while at the global level, it is the outcome of interstate accords and is thus a 
matter of voluntary consent. 
The notice and comment procedure also has been borrowed from other le-
gal systems, this time from national ones.  Still, even this is very different from 
the analogous procedures practiced in domestic legal systems.  In fact, at the na-
tional level, the actor who notifies, receives comments, and decides is a state au-
thority and is superior to the commenting party.  Transposed into international 
law, the procedure is structurally similar, but functionally different.  At the in-
ternational level, it is a state that listens to another state,43 and there is no higher 
authority that decides.  International law is inspired by domestic administrative 
law, but the function of the institution, transplanted into a different context, 
changes.  The notice and comment procedure becomes an instrument of consul-
tation and debate among equals subject to no higher authority. 
Finally, the public arena phenomenon manifests itself in the global legal 
space as well as in the national one.  There are multiple levels of government 
(that is, international organizations and national administrations) in potential 
conflict with each other, as well as interested parties that can exploit the differ-
ences between the regulators by playing off one against the other.44 
VII 
THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE RULES 
The rules created by international organs in furtherance of the treaties are 
defined in different ways through disciplines, guidelines, and standards.45  These 
rules do not create direct, legally binding obligations on the states.46  For some 
 
 42. Alberto Alemanno, Gli accordi di reciproco riconoscimento di conformità dei prodotti tra regole 
OMC ed esperienza europea, 17 DIRITTO DEL COMMERCIO INTERNAZIONALE 379 (2003). 
 43. But note the arguments of the previous paragraph on the growing participation of private ac-
tors. 
 44. Sabino Cassese, L’arena pubblica. Nuovi paradigmi per lo Stato, in LA CRISI DELLO STATO 74 
(2002). 
 45. See, e.g., GATS pt. II, art. VI, ¶ 4 (disciplines); SPS Agreement art. 5, ¶ 5 (guidelines); TBT 
Agreement art. 2 (standards). 
 46. The question of the direct application of norms and of their higher status has been discussed 
with respect to the norms contained in the WTO Agreement, not with reference to secondary norms.  
See, e.g., Armin von Bogdandy, Legal Equality, Legal Certainty, and Subsidiarity in Transnational Eco-
nomic Law—Decentralized Application of Art. 81.3 EC and WTO Law: Why and Why Not, in 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL CO-ORDINATION, STUDIES IN TRANSNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW IN HONOUR OF CLAUS-DIETER EHLERMANN 13 (Armin von Bogdandy et al. eds., 
2002) [hereinafter EUROPEAN INTEGRATION] (concluding that the direct applicability of WTO law is 
undesirable “because of the total lack of mechanisms which provide for legal equality between com-
petitors from different jurisdictions and which guarantee legal security”); Jacques H. J. Bourgeois, The 
European Court of Justice and the WTO: Problems and Challenges, in THE EU, THE WTO AND THE 
NAFTA, supra note 16, at 71-123 (exploring the question why WTO law raises specific problems and 
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of these rules, the relevant international organization debated the question of 
their legal status and decided not to make them binding.  For example, the in-
ternational rules governing accountants, set forth on the basis of “Additional 
Commitments” in Article XVIII of the GATS, are binding only when they are 
voluntarily inscribed in a Member’s schedule.  Currently, the Working Party on 
Domestic Regulation is trying to extend this regime to other professions.  At 
the end of this process, the “disciplines on domestic regulations” should become 
an annex to the GATS and thus assume a binding character.47 
Still, it cannot be said that global standards will have no effect until they are 
incorporated into an international treaty.  The example of the Disciplines for 
services, adopted in the context of the GATS, is illuminating.  First, the stand-
still provision found in GATS Article VI, Paragraph 5, in fact applies to them.  
Even before the Disciplines become enforced, Member States that have as-
sumed “specific commitments”48 may not apply domestic standards that “nullify 
or impair [the Disciplines].”49  Second, there is no need to incorporate the Dis-
 
challenges for the European Court of Justice); JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT 
AND THE WTO: INSIGHTS ON TREATY LAW AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 297-366 (2000) (examining 
the effect of treaties in domestic law in the United States and setting forth a policy analysis of the status 
of treaties in domestic legal systems). 
 47. See GATS pt. IV, art. XX, ¶ 3 (providing that “[s]chedules of specific commitments shall be 
annexed to this Agreement and shall form an integral part thereof”).  There has been far-reaching 
discussion of developing GATS Disciplines on the domestic regulation of services.  For an 
understanding of the issues involved, see the Papers Presented at the “Workshop on Domestic 
Regulation” organized by the WTO Working Party on Domestic Regulation (Mar. 29–30, 2004), 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/workshop_march04_e/workshop_programme_march04_e.ht
m (papers on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.); WTO Working Party on Domestic Regulation, Report 
on the Meeting held on 30 September 2003: Note by the Secretariat, S/WPDR/M/23, Doc. No. 03-6313 
(Nov. 27, 2003); WTO Working Party on Domestic Regulation, Communication from the European 
Community and Its Member States: Proposal for Disciplines on Licensing Procedures, S/WPDR/W/25, 
Doc. No. 03-3734 (July 10, 2003); WTO Working Party on Domestic Regulation, Communication from 
Singapore: GATS Article VI:5 and its relation to the future Article VI:4 Disciplines, JOB(03)/113 (June 
11, 2003) (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.); WTO Working Party on Domestic Regulation, 
Communication from the European Communities and Their Member States: Applicability of the 
Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector to Other Professional Services, 
S/WPDR/W/5, Doc. No. 00-2053 (May 19, 2000); WTO Council for Trade in Services, Article VI:4 of the 
GATS: Disciplines on Domestic Regulation Applicable to All Services: Note by the Secretariat, S/C/W/96, 
Doc. No. 99-0769 (Mar. 1, 1999); WTO Council for Trade in Services, Decision on Disciplines Relating 
to the Accountancy Sector: Adopted by the Council for Trade in Services on 14 December 1998, S/L/63, 
Doc. No. 98-5102 (Dec. 15, 1998); WTO Working Party on Professional Services, Report to the Council 
for Trade in Services on the Development of Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy 
Sector, S/WPPS/4, Doc. No. 98-4965 (Dec. 10, 1998); European Commission, Directorate General I, 
Note to the Member States: GATS Working Party on Professional Services Draft Disciplines on 
Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector, DGI/M/1/FLM D(98) (Jan. 22, 1998) (on file with Law 
& Contemp. Probs.). 
 48. MARKUS KRAJEWSKI, NATIONAL REGULATION AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN SERVICES: 
THE LEGAL IMPACT OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES (GATS) ON NATIONAL 
REGULATORY AUTONOMY 45 (2003) (explaining that WTO members have market access commit-
ments that prohibit them from “maintain[ing] certain specified restrictions of market access” and na-
tional treatment commitments that require them to “treat foreign services and service suppliers no less 
favourable than their own like services and suppliers” in “those service sectors which a WTO member 
specifically committed to these disciplines in its Schedule of Specific Commitments”). 
 49. See id. at 117-19 (discussing non-violation and impairment of specific commitments, and ex-
plaining that a Member that brings a non-violation nullification and impairment complaint must “estab-
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ciplines into the treaty.  Mutual recognition agreements have been created be-
tween developed countries for already internationalized professionals like ar-
chitects, accountants, and engineers.  These agreements are based on “common 
international standards” as set forth by Article VI, Paragraph 5, of the GATS.50  
Third, the doctrine of consistent interpretation must be applied:  when domestic 
law lends itself to multiple interpretations, it ought to be interpreted so as to 
conform to international law. 51 
The decisions of international bodies have direct legal consequences, even 
before they are incorporated into international treaties.52  Thus, global stan-
dards produce their effects in different and more complicated ways than na-
tional standards do.  For example, international law techniques for enforcing 
decisions differ from domestic ones in providing for a retaliation mechanism 
that functions as an ultimate rule of the global legal system.53  So although the 
WTO system borrows rules from other international systems (such as the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), World Health Or-
ganization (WHO), Codex Alimentarius, etc.), it also lends those rules muscle, 
so that they are effectively respected. 
VIII 
CONCLUSION 
The parts of the global legal system examined here appear as a network of 
sectoral governments.  These governments, however, are not separate, but 
rather reinforce each other mutually.  They do not make up a structural unit, 
but they do become a functional one, thanks to mutual ties and the division of 
labor between standardization bodies and bodies charged with imposing stan-
dards. 
In the global legal system one can see the use of many forms otherwise spe-
cific to states and supranational bodies like the EU:  regulators, committees, 
harmonization, and consultation procedures.  These forms rarely appear in the 
global legal order in the same way as in national or mature supranational sys-
 
lish that a benefit it could have reasonably expected to accrue to it under a specific commitment of an-
other member was nullified and impaired through the application of a measure”); see also id. at 151-53 
(discussing the impact of the disciplines on domestic regulations found in GATS Article VI, ¶ 5). 
 50. But only for a limited set of countries. 
 51. See generally Thomas Cottier, A Theory of Direct Effect in Global Law, in EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION, supra note 46, at 99, 109-10 (discussing the doctrine of consistent interpretation).  The 
doctrine of consistent interpretation is a principle that is applied by judges to treaties and common law.  
It is not clear why the domestic legal order, in the face of many possible interpretations, should not also 
conform to non binding international rules, especially when one considers that “WTO law is influenced 
by Anglo-American legislation which . . . has a tradition of explicit and detailed regulation. As a practi-
cal matter, these texts thus can often assist in interpreting broad and open textured language in domes-
tic law.”  Id. 
 52. As noted, non-binding standards often gain binding force through borrowing and enforcement 
by way of the WTO. 
 53. In the WTO, the offended state may, following the dispute resolution procedure set forth in 
Articles 21–23 of the DSU, take countermeasures in the form of tariffs so as to penalize the exports of 
the condemned country and obtain compensation for the losses incurred by the violation. 
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tems.  Here the regulator is not unitary, as in the states, but split in two: one 
body sets the rule and another imposes it.  Harmonization is encouraged, but 
not imposed from on high, as in the E.U.  The consultation procedures are car-
ried out by actors in a position of equality, while in domestic law, the state au-
thority that hears the views of the “administered” before making its decision is 
superior to them. 
Why do these different institutions not correspond to their national or 
European models?  Perhaps because they are transformed by the different con-
text.   
[W]e will have occasion to stress the importance, when transposing concepts of admin-
istrative law to the international sphere, of evaluating with prudence and circumspec-
tion the extent to which they are fully applicable at a particular stage of development, 
with due regard to the contrast between the infancy of international organisation and 
the maturity of the modern State.54 
It is not just that national and global administrative law are developed to a 
greater or lesser degree.  There are also some important qualitative differences 
between the two.55  First, national administrative laws rotate around a single 
pole—the state or the national government—even if in federal or regional states 
many authorities may establish primary rules.  Global administrative law, by 
contrast, is multi-polar.  It lacks a hierarchically superior power similar to the 
power of the central state, which prevails over the other powers in the domestic 
legal system.  The global administrative law system is characterized by sectoral 
authorities, and sometimes just sectoral networks of national authorities.  It is 
also for this reason that here it is better to speak of “governance” than “gov-
ernment” or “regimes.” 
Second, the various authorities of the global legal system have developed 
differently than states have.  A strong lawmaking power exists in both systems, 
and there are many legal prescriptions in the global legal system.  But the ex-
ecutive power is weak at the global level, because (for various reasons) sectoral 
enforcement is carried out by, or delegated to, state executive powers or their 
offices.  There are judicial authorities at the global (for example, the WTO) and 
the supranational (for example, the E.U.) levels, and their development is di-
rectly related to the influence of the global system over national legal systems.56 
That executive powers in the global system are underdeveloped creates a 
third kind of difference between global and state administrative law: the former 
is characterized by an “indirect rule” that consists of national authorities carry-
ing out the functions belonging in fact to the global system.  This enables the 
global system—in a way similar to the E.U.—to be effective using just a mod-
estly sized administration of its own.  But it also creates—as in the E.U.—
 
 54. C. WILFRED JENKS, THE PROPER LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS XL (1962). 
 55. On global administrative law, see generally Eleanor D. Kinney, The Emerging Field of Interna-
tional Administrative Law: Its Content and Potential, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 415 (2002). 
 56. This can be seen by comparing the E.U. with Mercosur, for example. 
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serious enforcement problems.  A modest administration means having limited 
tools to guarantee enforcement. 
Finally, the global legal system is of a mixed or composite character, as it is 
made up of both a state and an “ultra-state” dimension.  The latter, functioning 
as a kind of common law, not only requires national laws to conform to it, but 
also enables them to communicate with each other.  This communication takes 
place in two ways: (1) through the circulation of capital, goods, and services 
(and, to a lesser degree, businesses and persons); and (2) by the state legal sys-
tem’s opening up to recognize other legal orders.  Both of these ways enable a 
choice of the most favorable law and may lead to regulatory competition.  The 
communication between different legal systems, made possible by the consoli-
dation of higher and common rules, does not, however, unfold in a regular, 
symmetrical way:  there are important differences between sectors, goods, and 
objectives. 
The above analysis leads to two final points.  The first has to do with the dis-
tinction between domestic and international law.  The second concerns the 
functions of these two kinds of law in relation to private parties. 
International law has long been dominated by a dualistic conception of its 
separation from domestic law.  The states, the only subjects of international law, 
functioned as a screen dividing the one kind of law from the other.57  The exam-
ples considered in this article belie this conception.  The power of state inter-
mediation is in fact attenuated.  The state itself, in acting, must respect the stan-
dards established at the international level. 
The authority of domestic administrative law is imperative.  It imposes itself 
on the public, issues orders, grants permission, and establishes obligations.  
From this comes the characterization of substantive administrative law as the 
point of equilibrium between state authority and individual liberty.  The author-
ity of international administrative law functions differently.  It does not set lim-
its upon individuals, but rather upon states.  It is a higher law that imposes pro-
cedural obligations upon national authorities.  Its function is the inverse of 
domestic administration.  International administrative law serves to widen, 
rather than to narrow, the sphere of private liberty by limiting the action of the 
state.58 
This reversal in the function of international administrative law, compared 
to its domestic counterpart, requires a reconsideration of the principles that 
ground the two systems, taking care not to apply them mechanically in extrane-
 
 57. On this distinction, see BATTINI, supra note 9, at 4–5, 10. 
 58. John H. Jackson has noted that “[t]he basic purpose of the General Agreement [on Tariffs and 
Trade] is to constrain governments from imposing or continuing a variety of measures which restrain or 
distort international trade.”  JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 290 (3d ed., 1995).  National administra-
tive law also imposes limits on the public administration (for example, the duty to provide a hearing 
and judicial review).  But these limits serve to constrain the executive power of the administration, 
which is its primary function. 
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ous contexts.  Values and rules that have one meaning domestically assume an-
other one internationally.  It is enough to give two examples, concerning ac-
countability and participation. 
Accountability serves to protect individual liberties.  The national admini-
stration is asked to respect the law (the principle of legality) because the law 
comes from the legislature.  Citizens elect the legislature, and in so doing, con-
sent to the limits imposed upon them by the public administration.  The legisla-
ture and its laws thus protect citizens against the executive power, which limits 
their sphere of activity.  At the international level, this conceptual order does 
not hold.  Here, in fact, there is no executive power; the public authority func-
tions to enrich the sphere of private liberty, and the procedural standards of in-
ternational bodies are carried out against states in order to keep them at bay. 
An analogous observation can be made for participation.  This assumes a 
different significance in the international arena.  In domestic law, it is private 
actors who participate, and this participation has two connected purposes: to 
ensure the cooperation of citizens in the decisionmaking process and to give 
them voice in order to protect them in their relations with the public power.  In 
international administrative law, the situation is different.  Here, it is the state 
that is generally called on to participate,59 and it participates not as a defendant 
but as a vindicator of rights.  Therefore, the international community must lis-
ten to the point of view of each state if it wants to maintain general collective 
control over states’ actions.  Finally, in international administrative law there is 
no higher authority that decides after the consultation, because the decision is 
remanded to bilateral or multilateral collective decisionmaking.60 
 
 59. But, as noted above, private actors are playing a greater role. 
 60. This is part of the larger issue of democracy and law in global governance.  See generally Alfred 
C. Aman, Jr., Globalization, Democracy and the Need for a New Administrative Law, 10 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 125 (2003); Armin von Bogdandy, Demokratie, Globalisierung, Zukunft des 
Völkerrechts – eine Bestandsaufnahme, 63 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT 
UND VÖLKERRECHT 853 (2002); J.H.H. WEILER, THE RULE OF LAWYERS AND THE ETHOS OF 
DIPLOMATS, REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL LEGITIMACY OF WTO DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT, Harvard, Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 9/00 (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), 
available at http://www.jeanmonnet program.org/papers/00/000901.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2005). 
